tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-38600807.post7062315043722749309..comments2023-11-05T04:16:44.937-05:00Comments on Advanced Football Analytics (formerly Advanced NFL Stats): How to Talk to a Skeptic about Risky 4th DownsUnknownnoreply@blogger.comBlogger59125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-38600807.post-58755051270181594652012-10-23T11:15:41.972-04:002012-10-23T11:15:41.972-04:00Wow! I just found this site. Great read and good...Wow! I just found this site. Great read and good info! PCnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-38600807.post-12545091260113783702012-10-18T22:44:23.162-04:002012-10-18T22:44:23.162-04:00Phenomenal article. I will definitely be stealing...Phenomenal article. I will definitely be stealing some of these quotes to my "conventional wisdom" friends that think because the Packers can't run the ball, they should always punt in 4th and 1. Mike Bursiknoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-38600807.post-83528230506856652442011-12-26T11:58:56.122-05:002011-12-26T11:58:56.122-05:00The decision to go on fourth down is not only moti...The decision to go on fourth down is not only motivated by the likelihood of converting the fourth down. NFL coaches tend to be risk averse, because taking risk and failing gets you fired. The coach doesn't get fired for missing the 22-yard field goal. The coach might for going on fourth-and-1 after getting stuffed three times in three previous plays.Iannoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-38600807.post-17006580216750791972011-11-20T19:30:13.609-05:002011-11-20T19:30:13.609-05:00This seems like a good place to add a comment abou...This seems like a good place to add a comment about a Bears move. Ahead 31-20 with exactly 2 minutes to go, and San Diego now out of timeouts, they faked a punt on 4th and 8.<br /><br />The intended receiver was wide open, but punter Adam Podlesh threw a little high.<br /><br />The announcers panned the call, but I actually liked it. If the play succeeds, you can run out the clock and definitely win.<br /><br />Even if it fails, the Chargers need to score a TD, recover an onside kick, and get another score to force overtime (or 2 TDs to win). But the probability of success on the play, especially given the surprise element, is likely quite high.<br /><br />Of course, given the score and time remaining, it's likely that the call makes very little difference. As it happens, Phil Rivers threw an interception on the very next play, and the Bears still ran out the clock.<br /><br />So it may not get much press...Geoff Buchanhttp://blog.rotovalue.comnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-38600807.post-42830396241064398202011-11-18T08:08:19.996-05:002011-11-18T08:08:19.996-05:00In fact Ian, research suggests that one who loses ...In fact Ian, research suggests that one who loses x amount (a loss) will lose more satisfaction than another person will gain satisfaction from a windfall of x amount (a win). So, if there is an emotional edge here, it is all Atlanta's. As they would be more primed to avoid the loss than the Saints would be to gain the win. (In other words, not only should we question Jeff's application of emotion to the situation, but if anything, should view it in the reverse manner). And that is now two comments in the same thread where I've brought up loss aversion. So, here's the wikipedia link this time that discusses some of the major relevant studies.<br /><br />http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Loss_aversionBoston Chrisnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-38600807.post-41135225025567937342011-11-18T06:34:32.064-05:002011-11-18T06:34:32.064-05:00Jeff: correct me if I'm wrong, but you seem to...Jeff: correct me if I'm wrong, but you seem to be suggesting NO were more motivated because they knew that a stop would basically win the game. But you ignore the same factor applying to Atlanta. If that's what you're saying, then knowing that a failure essentially loses you the game surely provides as much of a boost to Atlanta as it does NO. <br /><br />All that happened is they gambled on a conservative play call from ATL. If it had been anything other than a run up the middle, any kind of misdirection, we probably wouldn't even be talking about it.Ian Simcoxhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01518825067469269377noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-38600807.post-67328206102653752312011-11-17T21:10:09.230-05:002011-11-17T21:10:09.230-05:00Jeff Fogle has it right. The priority of the defen...Jeff Fogle has it right. The priority of the defense cahanges based on game situations.<br /><br />In order to have meaningful data one needs to have similar game situations where the defense has the same priority.<br /><br />If a team leads by 17 pts in the 4th quarter with 7 minutes left and it's opponent goes for a 4th and 1 the priority of the defense is different in this situation than in the Atlanta/NO game situation.<br /><br />But because this situation makes-up many 4th down situations, this data is not as meaningful as it should be when applied to the Atlanta/NO game situation.<br /><br />Of coarse the team ahead by 17 pts is trying to stop it's opponent on 4th and 1 but it's priority is to protect the entire field against a big play, quick score, not to build a brick wall, but to force time off the clock as their opponent marches down field because then it would be almost impossible to lose the game.<br /><br />I have no clue why others can't understand this simple principle of how NFL games are played.Mike M.noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-38600807.post-60774377085351057362011-11-17T14:48:47.453-05:002011-11-17T14:48:47.453-05:00Brian, I love that you were a fighter pilot, b/c w...Brian, I love that you were a fighter pilot, b/c when a rambunctious commenter says, "random fighter pilot" its sounds so dang cool. I wish I could be a random fighter pilot. Or even a not random one. It might actually be demeaning if you were a random person, or a random actuary....but when he says fighter pilot, it just makes me want to listen and believe you. :-)Boston Chrisnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-38600807.post-8706985993683641662011-11-17T13:25:29.310-05:002011-11-17T13:25:29.310-05:00To James: yes, ask everybody. Get as much relevant...To James: yes, ask everybody. Get as much relevant information as you can. Raw numbers by themselves don't tell nearly the story that some think they do. Very imporant to talk to people on both sides of the ball. <br /><br />And, if a random fighter pilot was telling you about the general back-to-back tendencies in the NBA without accounting for Game Two being in Denver and involving a short-handed visitor...then yes, his data should be dismissed. It includes a lot of irrelevant pollution involving back-to-backers that weren't at altitude and didn't involve shorthanded teams. Same thing if he's talking about strikeouts in a Milwaukee Brewers home game using league-wide data that doesn't acknowledge how poor visibility gets when the roof is shut there. A commentator can dismiss bad data outright when it's clearly not accounting for key elements that are in play...he can say "get back to work and do a better study" without being obligated himself to do the study. <br /><br />Mike B: What's "optimal" changes with the situation. It's "optimal" to not risk giving up a big play when you lead by 10 points, so you live with giving up a little play. When the game is on the line, what's optimal changes. <br /><br />It's true that New Orleans wasn't life and death if they didn't stop that play. But, it was probably pretty close. Saints stop, and they're already in field goal range. Falcons make it, and they're 35-40 yards away from a field goal try against a tiring defense that's been on the field for 16 of the last 19 plays and 29 of the last 38 plays. Importantly, the Saints knew they could basically WIN the game with a stop...which became easy when Atlanta tried to run into an 11-man brick wall.<br /><br />To anonymous: seeing that bad samples are part of a study doesn't represent people who "don't understand math" People who do understand math are having a problem with the percentages being meaningful here...in addition to people who played or coached football at the NFL level.Jeff Foglenoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-38600807.post-80556567490987465262011-11-17T10:55:19.479-05:002011-11-17T10:55:19.479-05:00Actual anon- the phenomenon you are talking about ...Actual anon- the phenomenon you are talking about is not decreasing marginal utility. It is loss aversion. There has been a ton of psychological research done on this (which unfortunately I don't have any links to right now, but I'm sure you can find w/ a quick Google search)Boston Chrisnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-38600807.post-32603742689728469572011-11-17T10:55:05.812-05:002011-11-17T10:55:05.812-05:00"Everyone agrees the coach needs to "pla..."Everyone agrees the coach needs to "play the percentages" in situations like this. The particulars matter, but only at the margin. Everyone pretends to know what the percentages are, but they are kidding themselves. I'm just the guy giving you "the percentages." Ignore them at your own peril."<br /><br />This is always the point of highest comedy/irony in these discussions. <br /><br />Multiples times when this comes up you will see traditionalists construct arguments in the following way:<br /><br />1) I cannot agree with those stat geeks (guys figuring out the percentages). You have to do the traditional thing.<br />2) Appeal to authority/expertise.<br />3) Claim about how this particular situation was different from every other situation ever.<br />4) Claim that you have to stick to the percentages and do what works (as opposed to the stat heads who are clearly arguing you should go with your gut and not do what works?!?).<br /><br />The whole time completely oblivious to the fact they just contradicted themselves in the course of about 15 seconds.<br /><br />It is the same kind of people who won't believe the Monty Hall Problem outcomes unless you show them to them with a deck of cards. The don't understand math and so they don't believe it.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-38600807.post-38213825391916240252011-11-17T10:27:00.096-05:002011-11-17T10:27:00.096-05:00Anon: this has been discussed. WPA all has the sam...Anon: this has been discussed. WPA all has the same utility because you can only use it for one thing: to get to a win. You can't save .55 WPA until the end of the season.<br /><br />That said, if a team is vastly superior, they may want to take a slightly less profitable option in terms of WPA in favor of decreasing variance, while an inferior team may want to take the higher variance, but more profitable option. However, that seems like a consideration that would only exist in earlier-game situations. Once you get to 4th quarter or overtime in a close game, the more profitable option is the way to go even if it is higher variance in terms of WPA. The teams are too close and the number of decisive plays left too small to leave any potential WPA off the board.Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03886688819466931370noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-38600807.post-8923353504079467782011-11-17T10:16:10.852-05:002011-11-17T10:16:10.852-05:00Jeff - Formations and schemes aren't timeouts....Jeff - Formations and schemes aren't timeouts. You don't have to save them until the end of the game. Are you saying that defenses deliberately play sub-optimally on "normal" third downs or fourth downs? Just because they don't HAVE to make a stop?<br /><br />Besides, in the ATL-NO example, NO didn't HAVE to make a stop. If ATL converted, NO would have still had a a decent shot at winning the game. Not that it matters from the standpoint of how likely the conversion on 4th and 1 was. What matters was ATL's choice of play, NO's chosen defensive scheme and personnel, and (of course) execution on both sides of the ball.Michael Beuoyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03960600491528993233noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-38600807.post-28664693545152751672011-11-17T10:08:33.851-05:002011-11-17T10:08:33.851-05:00A quick question about the money analogy: shouldn&...A quick question about the money analogy: shouldn't we take utility into account? <br /><br />For example, if I were to ask the average person whether they would take a guaranteed one million dollars, or a 50/50 chance of two million, most people would take the one million. This implies that these two options are not actually equal, and that the utility of the one million is greater than the utility of the two million - diminishing marginal utility.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-38600807.post-52598378033015475252011-11-17T09:14:26.629-05:002011-11-17T09:14:26.629-05:00Jeff, I'd probably ask the offensive coordinat...Jeff, I'd probably ask the offensive coordinator, the head coach, an offensive linemen, the quarterback, the runningback... basically anyone who has had to either design or run a play. Does Golic know what his weaknesses are as a player/defender? Maybe... but I'm confident his opposing offensive coordinator does.<br /><br />Also, if some random fighter pilot came out and said something completely radical against the consensus but had the data to back it up I'd give him a listen. Then instead of dismissing him outright or saying his data is bunk I'd either have to ignore it or come up with the data to refute him. Saying, "No, I don't think that applies because that's what I think" isn't going to cut it.Jameshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01838293735141324662noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-38600807.post-55445391897902939602011-11-16T21:38:19.017-05:002011-11-16T21:38:19.017-05:00I didn't start as clearly as I could have. You...I didn't start as clearly as I could have. You were asking about "when" people should go for it. I think NFL defenders who have been involved in various 4th an 1 situations through their careers might have a sense of when defenses are best suited to stop one individual play when they HAVE to stop that play...in addition to knowing how to tackle.Jeff Foglenoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-38600807.post-32201753083053139482011-11-16T21:33:46.824-05:002011-11-16T21:33:46.824-05:00Wow...
Who better than a defender who's playe...Wow...<br /><br />Who better than a defender who's played 4th and 1's to ask about what works and what doesn't work on 4th and 1? <br /><br />Football isn't just tackling. It's schematics, assignments, working as a team to attack vulnerabilities in the offense. Football defenders are experts on a lot of things besides tackling people. <br /><br />The percentages you're giving may be strongly influenced by stuff that has nothing to do with this particular situation. A small subset of relevant data...merged into a much bigger set of irrelevant data doesn't lead to better information. <br /><br />Characterizing critiques from people who live inside a sport as "BS denial" when they're talking about assertions from outsiders that are polluted for various reasons represents a stunning lack of perspective. <br /><br />BS denial?<br /><br />If that was a joke I didn't get, I apologize. Otherwise...a stunning post. Disheartening in the extreme...Jeff Foglenoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-38600807.post-6269945599982861912011-11-16T18:48:54.145-05:002011-11-16T18:48:54.145-05:00Mike Golic might know a thing or two about stoppin...Mike Golic might know a thing or two about stopping a 4th and 1. But why on earth would anyone ask him when to go for a 4th and 1? <br /><br />"Football" guys like Golic are interesting to listen to about things like what's it like to be a player, to be injured, to be in a locker room, or to take a hit. But for the life of me, I'll never understand what makes guys like him think they are experts on anything beyond tackling people.<br /><br />Everyone agrees the coach needs to "play the percentages" in situations like this. The particulars matter, but only at the margin. Everyone pretends to know what the percentages are, but they are kidding themselves. I'm just the guy giving you "the percentages." Ignore them at your own peril. <br /><br />All the groaning and flailing by guys like this is just BS denial.Brian Burkehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12371470711365236987noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-38600807.post-56834195470752598322011-11-16T18:15:10.996-05:002011-11-16T18:15:10.996-05:00Appreciate the responses:
Agree with the general ...Appreciate the responses:<br /><br />Agree with the general theme that offenses should spread things out more to reduce the brick wall building. You'll see the smartest teams do that (remember how often Brady was throwing TD passes to an eligible lineman in goal line situations awhile back before defenses adjusted?) <br /><br />If the offense is in a clear run formation (not with everyone spread out), and has a history of trying to be macho...then the defense is much less afraid of a pass. That's where game theory comes in (saw that mentioned somewhere along the way). Atlanta didn't create much mystery in this current example. They did put a receiver in motion...but he then stopped within the box making it clear that he wasn't an option (and created even one less blocker because he was behind the offensive line so the guy responsible for him could fill a gap).<br /><br />I think this is at the heart of much of the negative response to the play. People saying things like "I don't like going for it....but if you are going to go for it...that's a HORRIBLE play to run." No disguise, and New Orleans was able to build the brick wall. <br /><br />I think the ideal "minimal" sample size would be "game on the line," "offense in clear run-formation." Start from there and build up. I don't think looking at all fourth and one's in all parts of the field in all game situations helps much here. <br /><br />And, I don't think it's the job of Golic or Polian to "do the math" to debunk an advanced stats site that's making a claim that is influenced by irrelevant samples in its sample size. (Polian does a lot of math by the way, he's been way ahead of the curve on clock management for years...FO's after the fact "estimated wins" undershot their actual win totals for every year of the Dungy/Caldwell/Manning combo..which B. Barnwell later said in a Grantland article was statistically significant after 4 years while it lasted about twice that--going from memory, something like that). It's the job of the advanced stat site to pin things down as accurately as possible given both statistical and "real football" indicators...and to humbly remember what Taleb said about the value of models in "The Black Swan." <br /><br />Appreciate the conversation. I think most would agree here that offensive creativity is important on fourth and one...particularly when the game is on the line. A play-by-play breakdown of the samples with formations and play results would help pin that day. Maybe the ultimate lesson will be something like "Going for it was the right call mathematically for Atlanta if they spread things out to keep the opposing defense honest, but was mathematically a horrible call if all they planned to do was hope their back could bust through what became an 11-8 blocking disadvantage with the receiver in motion stopping behind the line of scrimmage. Because NFL defenses have the ability to create a brick wall when needed, you need to dissuade them from doing so.Jeff Foglenoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-38600807.post-64696900835202676342011-11-16T17:20:18.516-05:002011-11-16T17:20:18.516-05:00The biggest takeaway I can see from situations suc...The biggest takeaway I can see from situations such as these is that the decision to go for it is often pretty close (.47 WP vs .42 WP in the case of the Atl/NO game). The key to being a long-term successful coach is not by always getting the tough decisions right, it’s by always getting the easier decisions right where the EV difference is greater. These individual decisions may have a smaller impact on an individual play, but there are far more of them and as a group have a much larger impact on the game. The tough decisions are more noticeable because we can match a single play to an outcome, but they are only moderately relevant to long term winning. Tough decisions are tough largely because they are so close. It’s fun to analyze (and making fun of coaches for being nitty and generally risk averse), but I find that they are often blown out of proportion. If there weren’t tiny mistakes earlier on, then perhaps there would be no need to talk about the large mistake at the end. So due to variability in using team specific data vs. league average and other noise the takeaway should be if it’s close then either decision is probably fine. It’s screwing up the ones that aren’t close that are going to kill you, even if they don’t make Sportscenter.<br /><br />In other news, Brian thanks for the site and all your work. I really appreciate and look forward to your insight and analysis.Johnnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-38600807.post-71094102941883133742011-11-16T17:09:50.851-05:002011-11-16T17:09:50.851-05:00Ah, I see Anonymous and Ian beat me to it. Should&...Ah, I see Anonymous and Ian beat me to it. Should've reloaded first.James Sinclairhttp://howconservativesdrovemeaway.blogspot.com/noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-38600807.post-87758762479621403122011-11-16T17:08:18.835-05:002011-11-16T17:08:18.835-05:00@Jeff Fogle,
You're probably right that "...@Jeff Fogle,<br />You're probably right that "many football people are very skeptical about this line of analytical framework", and you're definitely right that "not all 4th and one's are created equal", but that's an argument for improving the analytical framework, not dismissing it. If Golic or Polian or whoever else wanted to know if the numbers are any different when the data is more closely tailored to a particular situation, they're more than welcome to do the math themselves. The fact that they don't seem interested in trying tells me their real complaint is with something other than the methodology.<br /><br />That said, I think your "brick wall" point (like a lot of "but this situation is different so the numbers don't apply"-style arguments) is flawed because it only looks at the strategy considerations from one perspective. Yeah, on a crucial 4th-and-1 the defense can go all-out to stop the run down the middle, and that would decrease the offense's chance of converting with a run down the middle, but it would also greatly increase the offense's chance of converting with a run to the outside or a pass. Just as the Falcons' 4th-and-1 strategy looks dumb in retrospect because it didn't work, the Saints' strategy looks smart because it <i>did</i> work. But the Saints were taking a huge risk—if the Falcons had done anything other than run down the middle, there's a decent chance they would've won the game on that play.James Sinclairhttp://howconservativesdrovemeaway.blogspot.com/noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-38600807.post-34101309368385758892011-11-16T16:27:03.790-05:002011-11-16T16:27:03.790-05:00Jeff - if defenses don't want to 'sell out...Jeff - if defenses don't want to 'sell out' normally against a big play, does this mean that when they deploy the 'brick wall' defense on the crucial 4th down play they ought to be susceptible to the big play. <br /><br />So ideally, the offense should, with the game on the line, run a play-action or something else to go down the field, well away from 'the brick wall'.Ian Simcoxhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01518825067469269377noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-38600807.post-75586368104223281712011-11-16T16:20:25.242-05:002011-11-16T16:20:25.242-05:00Jeff,
There is no reason to assume a 4th down pla...Jeff,<br /><br />There is no reason to assume a 4th down play must always be a sneak or a dive and the defense knows this so sells out to stop it 100%. If that was the case every 4th and 1 play would be a play action to a TE for the first until defenses changed. You cannot have it both ways.<br /><br />Optimal strategy certainly includes having some play action and general pass plays on 4th and 1.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-38600807.post-23283877350272638482011-11-16T14:28:29.698-05:002011-11-16T14:28:29.698-05:00Mike B.
If the game isn't on the line, you do...Mike B.<br /><br />If the game isn't on the line, you don't want to sell out and risk putting the game on the line by allowing a big play on a surprise pass...or in the instances where the runner breaks through the brick all anyway (not suggesting there's a 0% success rate when defenses try to build the brick wall...but if the game is on the line, the team on defense is probably going to lose if he breaks through anyway---not at all the same thing for a defense sitting on a 10-point lead and the ball near midfield or something).<br /><br />NFL defenses have different approaches when an opponent isn't within one score. NFL defenses have different approaches in the second or third quarters than they do in the final moments of a close game or in overtime when the immediate impact of a play carries so much weight on a result. <br /><br />Using "all" fourth and short plays to create expecations for this specific fourth and short example is stirring the full spectrum of situations into mud. It hides the realities in play rather than describing them. <br /><br />And "debunking" the poor arguments of people who never read "Innumeracy" dodges the best arguments coming from the people who are most closely involved in fourth down decision-making.Jeff Foglenoreply@blogger.com